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This paper explores the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs)’ financial contracts and 
the characteristics of these VCs. Analyzing VCs' responses to our questionnaire, we find that 
VCs’ contractual behaviors differ according to affiliation and experience. VCs working for 
independent  investment  firms  write  contracts  providing  more  protection  against  risks  of 
agency conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs than VCs working for firms affiliated to 
a bank or “regional” investors. In addition, both independent and non-independent investors 
implement less protection against these risks when they have longstanding experience in the 
venture capital business. Finally, we differentiate the impact of affiliation and experience by 
type of portfolio company. 
 
 
Keywords: Venture Capital, Financial Contracting, Experience, Affiliation, Agency Conflicts 
JEL Classification: G24, G32 
 
 
                                                 
* Ph.D Candidate 
DRM-Finance, Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 - Paris Cedex 16 
- France. Tel : + 33 1 44 05 42 27 – Fax : + 33 1 44 05 40 23. Email : vanessa.joly@dauphine.fr 





1.  Introduction 
 
Academic  research  to  date  has  paid  considerable  attention  to  the  complex  design  of 
venture capital contracts (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Sahlman, 1990). In this paper, we 
address the specific relationship between the contractual choices and characteristics of venture 
capitalists (VCs). The main purpose is to understand whether VCs’ affiliation and experience 
affect  the  design  of  financial  contracts  and,  more  specifically,  the  level  of  contractual 
protection for VCs against risks of agency conflicts. 
Several  studies  validate  the  predictions  of  the  main  financial  contracting  models  and 
empirically demonstrate the critical influence of the level of risks of agency conflicts between 
the entrepreneur and the investor on contract design (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2003; Lerner, 1995). Implicitly, these papers consider VCs as an essentially homogeneous 
population.  Recent  research,  however,  has  shed  light  on  the  disparity  in  VCs'  goals  and 
behaviors depending on their affiliation (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann, Lindsey and 
Puri, 2008) or experience (Krohmer, 2007; Sorensen, 2008). Our paper therefore unite the 
literature examining VC contracts as a solution to agency conflicts with the new, fast-growing 
field of literature focusing on the heterogeneity of the VC population. In addition to the usual 
distinction between independent VCs and affiliated VCs (to banks in particular), this paper 
reviews the specificities of investors with a “regional” focus, funded by regional authorities 
and/or  regional  branches  of  mutual  banking  groups.  Also,  while  experience  is  usually 
measured  collectively  at  the  venture  capital  firm  level,  we  collect  and  use  data  on  VCs’ 
personal experience. 
This  paper  analyzes  the  recent  contractual  practices  of  French  VCs  concerning  the 
entrepreneur’s incentive plan, the types of financial securities used, control and voting rights, 
and staged financing. The data are collected from 99 French VCs' answers to a questionnaire 
administered  in  July  2007.  This  methodology  solves  confidentiality  issues  related  to 
disclosing  information  directly  from  real  contracts,  and  therefore  provides  access  to 
information based on a larger set of venture capital firms (“VC firms”) than a study based on 
real contracts. The data are collected from 54 VC firms. Authors analyzing real contracts 
examine substantially smaller samples (14 VC firms in Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) in a 
study focused on the USA) or several countries at once (70 VC firms in Kaplan, Martel and 
Strömberg, 2007). Concentration on a single country in our paper offers the benefit of a more 
homogenous sample. In addition, although the French venture capital market is the second-3 
 
largest European venture capital market after the UK (EUR 1.4 billion invested in 2007 in the 
seed, start-up and expansion stages), it has had little empirical research coverage.  
First, we show that independent VCs have more contractual protection against agency 
conflict risks than non-independent VCs, particularly VCs affiliated to a bank. This result 
adds to the literature on the affiliation-related variation in goals (Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 
2008) and involvement in monitoring portfolio companies (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 
2007),  while  incorporating  the  contractual  aspects  associated  with  these  disparities.  Our 
results also complement those of Hirsch and Walz (2006), who are, to our knowledge, the 
only researchers who have empirically examined the role of affiliation in contractual design; 
they  also  observe  differences  in  the  approach  between  independent  and  bank-affiliated 
investors in Germany. We further show that French VCs sponsored by regional authorities 
and/or  regional  branches  of  mutual  banking  groups  implement  less  complex  and  less 
protective contracts than independent investors. This observation validates the hypothesis that 
“regional”  investors,  similarly  to  bank-affiliated  investors,  are  under  less  of  a  financial 
performance  constraint  than  independent  investors.  Finally,  we  observe  that  independent 
investors implement more contractual protection, even when the agency conflict risk seems 
low or the financial amounts at stake are small.  
Studying the role of affiliation and experience simultaneously, we observe that experience 
is a significant determinant of contractual approach for both independent and other VCs. The 
longer  their  personal  experience  in  the  venture  capital  business,  the  less  they  will  seek 
contractual protection against agency conflicts. Experience is a significant determinant of the 
contracts regardless of the VC firm's investment stage focus or the average financial amount 
at  stake.  Exploring  the  relationship  between  experience  and  one  specific  feature  of  the 
contracts, Bengtsson and Sensoy (2008) observe that experienced US VCs are less likely to 
use  contracts  that  give  them  greater  cash  flow  rights  if  company  performance  is  poor. 
Conversely, contrary to our results, Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007) observe that outside 
the  US,  experienced  VCs  rely  on  more  sophisticated  contracts  offering  greater  protection 
against agency conflict risks. Our paper complements both these studies by introducing a 
measure of VCs’ individual experience. Our results confirm the idea that formal, complex 
contracts are costly (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) and that experience enables investors to 
rely  on  non-contractual  protection  mechanisms  against  agency  risks.  This  enhances  the 
literature highlighting the role of experience or reputation in the ability to provide added value 
(Chemmanur,  Krishnan,  and  Nandy,  2008;  Sorensen,  2007)  and  select  better  investment 
opportunities (Hsu, 2004; Sorensen, 2007). 4 
 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  short  review  of  the  relevant 
literature and the hypotheses of this study. Section 3 introduces the methodology and the 
sample characteristics. Section 4 describes VCs’ contractual practices. Section 5 first analyses 
the univariate relationship between VC characteristics and their contractual practices, then 
presents the results of multivariate analyses measuring the relative influence of various VC 
characteristics on the contracts. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Mitigating  agency  conflicts  between  investors  and  entrepreneurs  through  contracts  is 
partly  based  on  optimal  allocation  of  cash  flow  rights  between  the  investor  and  the 
entrepreneur.  The  strong  relationship  between  the  entrepreneur’s  compensation  and 
performance  is  explained  by  the  classical  principal-agent  literature  and  its  implication  in 
terms  of  screening;  and  security  design  theory  shows  that  senior  securities  conferring  on 
investors  a  senior  claim  on  cash  flows  are  a  clear  incentive  that  influences  the  agent’s 
behavior, and also signal good projects (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) for a literature 
review). The literature specifically relating to venture capital particularly stresses convertible 
securities’  optimality  for  mitigating  the  various  VC-entrepreneur  agency  conflicts. 
Convertibles provide the right incentive for both parties in a double moral hazard setting 
(Casmatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003) and reduce the risks of window dressing in staged financing 
(Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). In an incomplete contracting world, contractual mitigation of 
agency conflicts also requires optimal allocation of control and decision rights (Hart, 2001). 
The main aims of this allocation are to limit conflicts associated with private benefits (Aghion 
and Bolton, 1992), signal the quality of entrepreneurs (Dessein, 2005), or ensure efficient ex 
ante investments by reducing hold-up problems (see Bienz and Walz (2005) for a detailed 
review of the different strands of the literature on control rights). Finally, staged financing 
acts as a key management control mechanism, offering VCs an exit option (Gompers, 1995; 
Salhman, 1990). Being by nature a short-term financing mechanism, it can be analyzed as a 
means  of  selection  as  presented  in  the  Dessein  model  (2005).  Staging  also  reduces 
renegotiation  opportunities  for  the  entrepreneur,  and  therefore  brings  down  hold-up  risks 
(Neher, 1999).  
All these contractual provisions are therefore designed to reduce agency conflicts related 
to  moral  hazard,  adverse  selection  and  hold-up  risks.  Although  the  degree  of  contractual 
protection is affected by  the level of these risks of conflict (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and 5 
 
Strömberg, 2003; Lerner, 1995), not all VCs have the same incentive to maximize value and 
therefore  to  mitigate  agency  risks.  VCs  working  for  independent  firms  are  under  great 
pressure  to  maximize  financial  gains  as  they  are  constantly  seeking  to  improve  their 
reputation  in  order  to  raise  additional  funds,  and  because  they  are  operating  under  high-
powered  compensation  packages  (Lerner,  Hardymon  and  Leamon,  2005).  Investments  by 
corporate VCs, meanwhile, often pursue strategic objectives (Chesbrough, 2002; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann, 2002). Likewise, firms affiliated to a bank mainly invest in 
venture capital projects with the aim of developing their core business and will therefore back 
the less risky stages, when the investee company will shortly be able to raise traditional bank 
financing  (Hellmann,  Lindsey  and  Puri,  2008).  Differences  in  investment  behavior  and 
performance according to affiliation are also observed among German VCs (Hirsch and Walz, 
2006; Tykvová, 2006; Tykvová and Walz, 2007). 
With  their  greater  financial  performance  constraints,  independent  investors  can  be 
expected  to  seek  more  protection  against  agency  conflict  risks  than  bank-affiliated  or 
corporate VCs. To our knowledge, only Hirsch and Walz (2006) have empirically described 
the influence of affiliation on contractual design. They observe in particular that German 
independent  VCs  hold  more  financial  securities  and  voting  rights,  which  induce  active 
intervention, than banks or public players; the differences are less pronounced for VCs' veto 
and liquidation rights.  
A fourth, seldom studied, category of affiliation consists of VC firms affiliated to public 
authorities and/or governments. These entities are generally closely linked to governmental 
programs  promoting  the  development  of  start-ups  and  play  a  certification  role  for  those 
programs (Lerner, 2002). In France, investments by government-affiliated VCs are very low 
(0.024% of GDP over the period 1997-2003 according to Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007). 
However, 10.1% of the VCs in our sample work for VC firms drawing most of their funds 
from  regional  authorities  and/or  regional  branches  of  mutual  banking  groups  (Caisses 
d’Epargnes, Banques Populaires, etc.). Like government-affiliated VC firms, “regional” VC 
firms are likely to pursue other objectives than financial performance alone (development of 
the regional economic fabric, for instance) and should therefore be under less pressure than 
independent investors to maximize financial performance. 
 
H1:  Independent  VCs  implement  greater  contractual  protection  against  risks  of  agency 
conflicts with the entrepreneur than affiliated or “regional” investors. 
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Recent papers demonstrate that experience influences the investment behavior of financial 
market players (Feng and Seaholes, 2005; Korniotis and Kumar, 2008) and VCs (Gompers, 
1996; Krohmer, 2007; Sorensen, 2008). However, empirical results on the role of experience 
in the design of venture capital contracts are rare and sometimes conflicting. Focusing on one 
specific feature of VC contracts, Bengtsson and Sensoy (2008) observe that experienced US 
VCs  are  less  likely  to  use  contracts  that  give  them  greater  cash  flow  rights  if  company 
performance  is  poor.  Outside  the  US,  on  the  contrary,  experienced  VCs  rely  on  more 
sophisticated  contracts  offering  greater  protection  against  agency  conflict  risks  (Kaplan, 
Martel and Strömberg, 2007). These studies measure experience at the investment firm level; 
however, experienced VCs frequently leave the firm where they initially gained significant 
experience in the venture capital business in order to set up their own investment firm. Using 
a  measure  of  VCs'  individual  experience  is  particularly  necessary  as  the  reinforcement 
learning theory
1 predicts that experience will have more impact on a professional’s future 
actions when acquired first-hand than when the professional has been told about something 
without  experiencing  it  personally.  Some  authors  indirectly  examine  the  question  of 
experience. The findings of Bienz and Walz (2005) in Germany, for instance, indicate that 
practices for control and decision rights are progressively converging towards the US model, 
indirectly suggesting a learning phenomenon. Cumming (2005), on the  contrary, finds no 
evidence in Canada of any convergence toward the US model in which convertible preferred 
shares are almost the only instrument used.  
Writing  detailed  contracts  is  costly.  Beyond  the  direct  costs  associated  with  their 
implementation,  complex  contracts  are  likely  to  be  detrimental  to  the  quality  of  the 
relationship between the parties. Negotiation of detailed contracts will for instance encourage 
opportunistic  behaviors  on  actions  that  cannot  be  contractually  secured  (Bernheim  and 
Whinston, 1998); the use of rational formal control mechanisms signals a lack of trust in the 
entrepreneur  and  is  therefore  prejudicial  to  cooperation  between  the  parties  (Ghoshal  and 
Moran, 1996). In order to avoid these costs, investors are likely to use any possible substitutes 
for  contractual  mechanisms  in  order  to  mitigate  risks  of  agency  conflicts.  In  the  case  of 
strategic  alliances  for  instance,  reputation  is  a  substitute  for  explicit  control  mechanisms 
(Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Because experienced VCs have access to the best investment 
opportunities (Hsu, 2004; Sorensen, 2007), they should find it easier to do without contractual 
mechanisms designed to reveal the nature of the agent. In addition, experienced VCs' greater 
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capacity to provide added value (Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy, 2008; Sorensen, 2007) is 
likely to elicit better behavior from entrepreneurs, because it is in their interest to pursue a 
relationship  with  such  experienced  investors.  More  generally,  experienced  VCs  are  more 
likely to easily establish governance based on personal relationships and informal agreements 
founded on trust and reputation. 
 
H2: The more experienced the VCs, the less they include contractual mechanisms aiming at 
mitigating risks of agency conflicts with the entrepreneur. 
 
3.  Methodology and Sample Description 
 
The main objective of this paper is to understand whether VC affiliation and experience 
have any influence on financial contract design. However, features of the financial contracts 
between VCs and their portfolio companies are not available in commercial private equity 
databases.  Data  must  be  collected  manually.  A  few  researchers  have  been  able  to  obtain 
financial  contracts  directly  from  VCs  (Kaplan  and  Strömberg,  2003;  Kaplan,  Martel  and 
Strömberg,  2007;  Lerner  and  Schoar,  2005),  making  an  important  contribution  to  our 
knowledge of venture capital contracts. But the confidentiality required for financial contracts 
complicates access to these documents (term sheets, security purchase agreements, company 
business plans, VCs’ internal analysis of the investment, etc.). An alternative approach taken 
by some studies is to use private databases (Bienz and Walz, 2005 in Germany; Cumming, 
2005 in Canada; Cumming, Schmidt and Walz, 2008 on a multinational scope) or, in very rare 
cases,  documents  prepared  to  meet  legal  filing  requirements  in  the  U.S.  (Bengtsson  and 
Sensoy, 2008). 
Our paper analyses the answers to a questionnaire administered to French VCs in July 
2007.  Data  collection  with  a  questionnaire  solves  the  confidentiality  issues  inherent  to 
disclosing information directly from real contracts, and provides information for a larger set 
of VC firms (54 firms). Authors analyzing “real” contracts work with substantially smaller 
samples  of  VC  firms  (14  VC  firms  in  Kaplan  and  Strömberg,  2003)  or  examine  several 
countries at once (70 VC firms in Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg, 2007). The single-country 
focus of our paper offers the advantage of a more homogenous sample. In addition, studies 
based on “real” contracts involve potential selection biases (acknowledged by the authors), as 
the sample of transactions is not randomly selected by the VCs. Studies based on private 8 
 
databases  include  substantially  more  transactions  and  VC  firms  (Cumming,  Schmidt  and 
Walz, 2008) but often have little information on contractual features. 
We are aware that data collection with a questionnaire also has certain limitations. For 
instance,  it  is  impossible  to  verify  whether  the  opinions  and  beliefs  measured  in  the 
questionnaire  match  actions  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001).  The  individual’s  capacities  and 
understanding of the question, and non-uniform perception of scale, are further potential risks. 
Finally, the answers may be influenced by certain recent events. 
Surveyed VCs were asked to indicate how frequently (on a 5-level scale) they implement 
various  contractual  mechanisms,  provide  information  on  the  characteristics  of  their 
investment  firm,  and  answer  questions  on  their  own  experience.  We  cross-checked  and 
completed data related to the VC firms and the VCs by examining the relevant VC firms' 
websites, professional yearbooks, the Thomson VentureXpert™ database, and the business 
press.  
A total of 114 VCs answered the questionnaire, corresponding to a return rate of 12.2%. 
This is satisfactory in view of the confidentiality of data concerning VC contract design, the 
length of the questionnaire, and the very broadly targeted initial contact list
2. We eliminated 8 
unusable  answers  and  7  answers  from  professionals  whose  position  in  the  firm  did  not 
guarantee active participation in the structuring of the transactions. The final sample thus 
comprises  99  answers  from  VCs  working  in  54  different  VC  firms,  corresponding  to  an 
average of 1.8 answers per firm. There is only one answer per firm for 61% of the VC firms, 
and  the  maximum  number  of  answers  per  VC  firm  is  6.  As  the  analysis  is  based  at  the 
individual level, we control for bias related to multiple answers from professionals in the 
same VC firm. To do so we measure the “dispersion” of one individual’s answers as the 
average difference across all questions (in absolute terms) between the individual’s answer 
and the whole-sample mean answer to this question. No significant difference is observed 
between  the  average  “dispersion”  for  the  sub-sample  of  VCs  working  for  VC  firms  with 
multiple answers and the average “dispersion” for the sub-sample of VCs working for VC 
firms with a single answer.  
Variables describing the VC firms in which our sample VCs work are the following. 
VCF_Independent  is  an  indicator  variable  that  equals  1  when  the  VC  works  for  an 
independent  firm,  0  otherwise.  The  management  firms  of  "independent"  VC  firms  are 
controlled by their managers and/or independent of their fund providers. These VC firms 
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generally raise funds from a number of different investors, unlike affiliated VC firms, usually 
financed by a very small number of fund providers. The binary variable VCF_Bank identifies 
investors working for VC firms affiliated to a financial institution. The management firms of 
VC firms affiliated to a financial institution are controlled by banks or insurance companies. 
VCF_Regional is set at 1 if the VC works for a VC firm financed by regional authorities 
and/or regional branches of a mutual banking group (Caisses d’Epargne, Banques Populaires). 
The variable VCF_Age measures the age of the VC firm in 2007. VCF_Amount is the amount 
under management by the firm (in millions of euros) and VCF_Number is the number of 
companies in its portfolio. The variable VCF_Early_Stage is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm which makes more than 50% of its investments 
in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage), 0 otherwise.  
Variables describing the VC’s individual experience are the following. VC_Experience 
measures  the  number  of  years  the  VC  has  spent  in  the  venture  capital  industry. 
VC_US_Syndication  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  VC  invests  “occasionally”,  “often”  or 
“always”  alongside  Anglo-American  VC  firms  or  firms  affiliated  to  an  Anglo-American 
entity, 0 otherwise. Last, VC_Science_Education takes the value of 1 when the individual has 
an initial or complementary educational background in sciences (engineering school, master's 
degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  
Table 1 provides statistical information on the sample composition. 47.5% of the VCs 
work for an independent VC firm; 34.3% for a VC firm affiliated to a financial institution; 
10.1%  for  a  “regional”  VC  firm.  The  remaining  investors  work  for  firms  affiliated  to  a 
corporate or to the public sector. The average individual experience in the venture capital 
industry is 9.9 years
3. 65.8% of the VCs declare that they invest “occasionally”, “often” or 
“always” alongside Anglo-American VC firms or VC firms affiliated to an Anglo-American 
entity. 44.6% of the VCs have an educational background in science. The average age of VC 
firms is 12.9 years; the average amount under management is EUR 236.6 million, with an 
average of 51.7 portfolio companies. 55.1% of respondents work for a VC firm making more 
than 50% of its investments in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage). 
Comparison of the averages by affiliation shows a significantly larger fraction of investors 
with  a  scientific  educational  background  in  independent  firms.  The  average  number  of 
portfolio  companies  is  significantly  smaller  for  independent  investors  than  for  non-
independent investors. The portion of investors exposed to Anglo-American market practices 
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92 individuals (92.9%) and VC_US_Syndication for 73 individuals (73.7%). 10 
 
and  the  average  amount  under  management  are  significantly  higher  for  bank-affiliated 
investors than for “regional” investors.  
Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables. Both measures of VC firm size 
(amount  under  management  and  number  of  portfolio  companies)  are,  logically,  positively 
correlated, and also positively correlated with the age of the firm. VC firms focusing mainly 
on early stage investments are younger. Independent firms have fewer portfolio companies. 
VC firms affiliated to a financial institution have greater amounts under management and 
invest in a larger number of transactions. “Regional” VC firms have smaller amounts under 
management. Finally, the variables describing the characteristics of respondent VCs show low 
or insignificant cross-correlation and correlation with VC firm characteristics (except for the 
correlation between the number of portfolio companies and VC experience).  
 
4.  VCs’ Contractual Practices 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale varying from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“always”), 
how  frequently  they  implement  various  contractual  mechanisms  and  financial  securities. 
Questions were divided into four main topics, to give a detailed reflection of the actual rights 
attributed  through  the  financial  contracts  and  securities  (incentive  scheme  for  the 
entrepreneur, type of securities held by the VC, control and decision rights, staged financing). 
The first rows in Table 3 report the overall mean for each mechanism and the percentage of 
VCs that frequently (“often” or “always”) use these contractual provisions.  
To  link  the  entrepreneur’s  compensation  to  performance  and  implement  an  incentive 
scheme,  French  VCs  generally  include  a  French  instrument  called  the  BSPCE  (Bon  de 
Souscription de Parts de Créateurs d'Entreprise), sometimes referred to in English as “New 
business creator share warrant” or “Share warrant for entrepreneurs”. BSPCEs, which are 
reserved for employees and management of young companies and benefit from a favorable 
tax regime, are “often” or “always” used by more than 50% of respondents. The second most 
common incentive arrangement is the BSA (Bon de souscription en actions), referred to in 
English as “Equity warrant”. When granting the entrepreneur options that allow her to access 
subsequent additional equity (BSPCEs, BSAs or stock options), 75.5% of investors frequently 
make  the  exercise  of  these  options  contingent  on  accounting  or  financial  performance 
milestones and 58.2% on the entrepreneur remaining with the company (time vesting). This 
result suggests broader use of time vesting than observed by Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg 11 
 
(2007) who find that only 20% of the transactions in "French law" countries include such a 
mechanism.  
Investing mostly as minority shareholders, VCs use a widely varying range of securities. 
The  most  frequently  used  are  convertible  bonds,  which  are  used  “often”  or  “always”  by 
55.6% of investors. Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007)  find, on the contrary, that this 
security was the least used in French law countries. Our results are based on more recent data, 
indicating a change in the use of convertibles over time. VCs also frequently subscribe shares 
with equity warrant attached (ABSAs - Actions avec Bon de Souscription, 48.5%), ordinary 
shares (45.5%)  and convertible preferred shares (41.4%).  Other securities (straight bonds, 
bonds with equity warrant attached, bonds redeemable in shares and non-convertible preferred 
shares) are frequently subscribed by less than 30% of investors (for brevity purposes, these 
securities are not shown in Table 3). These results confirm the wide range of securities used in 
venture capital financing, as already observed in several non-US data settings (Cumming, 
2005; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher, 2003) and contrast with 
the quasi-exclusive use of convertible preferred shares by US VCs. Generally, the literature 
makes  no  distinction  between  convertible  bonds  and  convertible  preferred  shares,  both 
considered  equivalent  in  terms  of  the  economic  payoff:  both  promise  fixed  income  until 
conversion  (Gompers,  1997;  Cornelli  and  Yosha,  2003)  and  liquidation  preference  over 
ordinary shareholders. However, unlike debt, failure to pay dividends on preferred shares does 
not trigger liquidation (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). In France, preferred dividends (including 
accrued dividends) are rarely used and their frequency of use is not correlated with the use of 
preferred  shares.  The  use  of  preferred  shares  appears  to  be  essentially  associated  with  a 
liquidation preference. Redeemable shares are mostly used in the Anglo-American countries 
and are rarely found in France.  
Over 70% of the investors “often” or “always” have one or more seats on the board of 
directors. This result contrasts with the findings of Kotha and Talmor (2005) indicating that in 
Great  Britain  only  30%  of  companies  that  received  institutional  investment  from  private 
equity firms have any institutional investor (a “VC”) on the board. In the US in contrast, the 
findings of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) suggest that nearly all venture-backed firms have 
one or more VCs on their board (with an average board size of 6 members, of which 2.5 are 
VCs or their representatives). Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007) show that outside of the 
US, investors are less likely to have control of the board. Although our information is not 
directly comparable, we observe that French VCs invest mainly as minority shareholders and 
only 7.1% of them frequently have control of the board while they are a minority shareholder. 12 
 
In addition, the right to take control of the board in the event of poor performance, which is 
commonly  included  in  US  contracts  (Kaplan  and  Strömberg,  2003),  is  only  frequently 
negotiated by 4.1% of French investors. On the other hand, French venture capital contracts, 
like US contracts (Gompers, 1997), explicitly grant control rights to investors through the 
practically automatic inclusion of specific covenants that reduce the entrepreneur's rights to 
make important decisions (veto rights).  
We  distinguish  between  two  different  forms  of  staging  (Gompers,  1995;  Kaplan  and 
Strömberg,  2003):  the  capital  infusion  generally  takes  place  in  several  rounds  (ex  post 
staging) and committed within-round funding may be provided in tranches (ex ante staging). 
Half of the French investors use ex post staging, but French VCs are less likely to frequently 
use ex ante staging. When implementing staged financing, almost half of the investors make 
the next capital infusions contingent on performance milestones.  
VCs use the various contractual provisions designed to mitigate risks of agency conflicts 
in  a  complementary  manner.  Answers  to  the  questionnaire  show  a  positive,  significant 
correlation
4 (>30%) between each frequency of use for the following contractual mechanisms: 
(i) BSPCEs granted to entrepreneurs, (ii) liquidation preference for VCs, (iii) board seats for 
VCs or their representatives, (iv) VCs' veto rights in critical decisions (the frequencies of use 
for the different veto rights are also highly cross-correlated), (v) ex-post staging, (vi) ex-ante 
staging
5. The frequency of use of the above mechanisms is negatively correlated with the 
frequency of use of ordinary shares and positively correlated with the frequency of use of 
shares with equity warrant attached (ABSAs) and convertible preferred shares. As mentioned 
earlier, the role of convertible preferred shares in mitigating agency conflict risks has been 
widely covered by the theoretical literature. The importance of shares with equity warrant 
attached in reducing these risks lies in the resulting staging of capital infusions (also, the 
frequency  of  use  of  shares  with  equity  warrant  attached  is  strongly  correlated  with  the 
frequency of use of staged financing). 
 
5.  The Determinants of VC’s Contractual Practices 
 
The main objective of this section is to add to the existing literature on the determinants of 
venture capital contracts and to examine whether the contractual design differs according to 
                                                 
4  For  brevity  purposes,  the  table  presenting  the  Spearman  correlations  of  the  questionnaire  answers  is  not 
reported.  
5 The utilization frequencies of certain veto rights, however, show lower correlation (<30%) with staging.  13 
 
investors’  affiliation  and  experience.  Table  3  presents  univariate  analyses  of  contractual 
practices  by  investor  affiliation  and  experience  and  the  type  of  investment  stage  focus. 
Multivariate analyses (Table 4) are then performed in order to measure the relative influence 
of these criteria over the level of protection VCs have against agency conflict risks. Last, we 
differentiate the impact of affiliation and experience according to portfolio company profile 
(Table 5). 
 
a.  Univariate Analyses  
Comparison of the mean answers provided by investors working for independent and non-
independent  VC  firms  shows  that  the  former  rely  significantly  more  than  the  latter  on 
contractual mechanisms reducing the risks of agency conflicts. Independent investors grant 
significantly more share warrants for entrepreneurs (BSPCEs) to the portfolio companies’ 
managers and when including options conferring access to subsequent additional equity, they 
more often make exercising those options contingent on performance (particularly operational 
performance) milestones and the amount of time spent in the company by managers. They 
more often use ex ante and ex post staged financing and more frequently have subsequent 
capital infusions conditional on reaching performance (particularly operational performance) 
milestones. Independent investors are more likely to sit on the board, as well as to obtain the 
majority of board seats while minority shareholders and have veto rights on critical decisions. 
Independent investors also receive liquidation preference rights more frequently. Finally, they 
make  less  use  of  ordinary  shares  than  other  VCs,  but  use  more  complex  securities  with 
specific features that mitigate agency conflict risks, particularly shares with equity warrant 
attached (the French ABSA is the security most commonly used by independent investors) or 
convertible preferred shares (although with a slightly lower significance level). We complete 
the univariate analyses  of the role played by affiliation in contract design first through a 
comparison of “regional” and independent VCs’ mean answers, then with a comparison of 
bank-affiliated and independent VCs’ mean answers. “Regional” investors and bank-affiliated 
investors  include  these  contract  mechanisms  significantly  less  often  than  independent 
investors.  “Regional”  investors  seem  to  rely  on  these  clauses  less  than  bank-affiliated 
investors, although the differences between the means are mostly non-significant.  
Investors with more experience in the venture capital industry (measured by the number of 
years spent in the business) less frequently use mechanisms protecting them against agency 
conflict risks (however, results on some items - ordinary shares, shares with equity warrant 
attached (ABSAs) and veto rights - are not significant). The collective experience of the VC 14 
 
firm, measured as its age, also seems to negatively influence the use of contractual provisions 
mitigating the risks of conflicts. Our results (not reported here for brevity purposes) reveal no 
significant univariate difference in contractual practices according to VC firm size (proxied 
by either the amount under management or the number of portfolio companies), the variable 
generally used to measure investors’ experience (Gompers, 1996; Hochberg, Ljungqvist and 
Lu, 2007; Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg, 2007).  
VCs who “occasionally”, “often” or “always” invest alongside Anglo-American VC firms 
(or  alongside  VC  firms  affiliated  to  an  Anglo-American  entity)  make  greater  use  of 
contractual mechanisms mitigating agency conflicts (results on staging and veto rights are 
however not significant). This finding might be explained by the fact that integration into the 
global  economy increases exogenous pressures  to introduce practices widely perceived as 
appropriate and efficient (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). In addition, syndication leads 
to the development of networks (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007), and networks are key 
vectors in the institutional isomorphism process (see Guler, Guillén and Macpherson (2002) 
for a literature review on how practices tend to diffuse). Compared to their counterparts in 
other countries, VCs in common law countries use more sophisticated contracts that are better 
able  to  reduce  agency  conflict  risks  (Kaplan,  Martel  and  Strömberg,  2007).  This  should 
logically result in greater use of anti-agency problem provisions for VCs who have developed 
stronger syndication network ties with Anglo-American VCs.  
Educational  background  is  a  third  dimension  of  VCs’  experience.  Investors  with  an 
educational background in science use contractual provisions designed to mitigate agency 
conflicts more often than other investors. “Scientific” VCs are likely to work for VC firms 
focusing mainly on companies with a high technical content (biotechnologies, high-tech, etc.), 
where  agency  conflict  risks  are  particularly  high  (due  especially  to  the  large  portion  of 
intangible assets, notably human capital). This investment focus may explain the observed 
difference in contractual behavior between “scientific” and other VCs. 
However, the influence of the degree of agency conflict risks on contractual design is 
more directly validated by comparing the contracts written by investors working for VC firms 
with  an  early-stage  focus  (in  which  information  asymmetry  and  agency  conflict  risks  are 
accentuated) with those implemented by later-stage focused investors. Investors arrange more 
contractual protection when investing in companies with higher agency conflict risks. The 
finding on the use of convertible bonds is the only result which is contrary to predictions 
concerning  the  role  of  senior  securities  in  the  mitigation  of  information  asymmetry  and 15 
 
agency conflict risks. The periodic coupons associated with these securities may however 
explain why they are used less for early-stage investments.  
 
b.  Multivariate Analyses 
Univariate analyses have shown that financial contracts and securities differ significantly 
according to VCs’ affiliation and experience. In order to measure the relative importance of 
these  factors,  we  assign  each  VC  an  index  (I)  which  is  a  measure  of  the  level  of  her 
contractual protection against agency conflict risks. This index is constructed as the sum of 
dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the VC includes the following contractual provisions 
more often than the sample mean: 
(i)  performance vesting of the entrepreneur’s equity stake
6; 
(ii)  time vesting of the entrepreneur’s equity stake
6; 
(iii)  liquidation preference; 
(iv)  investment  through  convertible  preferred  shares,  shares  with  equity  warrant 
attached (ABSAs) or convertible bonds, associated with less use of ordinary shares 
than the sample mean; 
(v)  subsequent funding contingent on performance milestones
7; 
(vi)  VC board seat(s);  
(vii)  three out of the five identified VC veto rights.  
The index varies from 0 to 7. Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007) construct a similar 
index, where dummy variables indicate the presence of certain provisions in VC contracts. 
Some of the mechanisms used in this paper for construction of index (I) differ or complement 
those used in the index constructed by Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007). One of the 
dummy  variables  in  these  authors’  index  indicates  the  use  of  performance  milestones  for 
issuing  additional  shares  (equity  milestones)  to  the  entrepreneur  or  subsequent  capital 
infusions (funding milestones). Because the equity and funding milestones mechanisms are 
reviewed separately in the literature we use two distinct variables in our index (see (i) and 
                                                 
6 Dummies (i) and (ii) are contingent on the VC frequently granting the entrepreneur at least one of the options 
that allow her to access subsequent additional equity (stock option, share warrants for entrepreneurs (BSPCE), 
equity warrants (BSA)). Components (i) and (ii) of index I aim at identifying VCs who more frequently grant the 
entrepreneur access to additional shares contingent on performance or on remaining with the company. Answers 
related to the use of the contingent vesting of entrepreneur’s shares are given independently of the frequency of 
use of additional shares granted to the entrepreneur. For instance, a VC may “rarely” include access to additional 
equity for the entrepreneur but, when she does, will “always” make it contingent on performance milestones. For 
this reason, we must first identify VCs that frequently rely on options allowing the entrepreneur to subsequently 
increase her stake in the company, and look at the frequency of use of performance or timing conditions by those 
VCs only. 
7 Dummy (v) is contingent on the VC frequently using staged financing. 16 
 
(v)). In addition, in view of the large body of literature on the role of securities (notably 
convertibles) as a means of mitigating agency conflicts, index (I) adds a variable reflecting the 
type of securities (see (iv)) to the index constructed by Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007). 
Their index includes a variable measuring control of the board by individuals other than the 
founders, while index (I) focuses more specifically on VC's rights, with a variable indicating 
whether the VC sits on the board of directors (see (vi)) and a variable reflecting veto rights 
(see (vii)). Index (I) does not include any variable related to redeemable shares, as they are 
seldom used in France. 
We estimate the models using Poisson regressions (Table 4) where the dependent variable 
is  index  (I).  These  regressions  include  independent  variables  that  measure  affiliation  and 
experience as defined in section (a) above. Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 4 only include 
variables measuring affiliation and experience. In regressions (3) to (5), we also control for 
the influence of the VC firm’s investment focus (early stage vs. later stage), as well as its size 
and age
8. Regression (6) introduces interaction variables between affiliation and experience. 
The results of the regressions displayed in Table 4 show that independent VCs have more 
contractual protection against the risks of agency conflicts than non-independent investors 
(Hypothesis H1), and in particular, than bank-affiliated or “regional” investors. These results 
are robust under all specifications. The difference observed between the contracts written by 
independent VCs and those established by bank-affiliated VCs extend the literature on their 
different objectives (Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 2008) and provide a basis for definition of 
the contractual implications of these disparities. A parallel can also be drawn between more 
sophisticated and protective contracts by independent VCs and their more active involvement 
in monitoring their portfolio companies (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 2007). 
“Regional” VCs establish less complex and less protective  contracts than independent 
investors. This observation validates the hypothesis that “regional” investors, similarly to their 
bank-affiliated  counterparts,  are  under  less  of  a  financial  performance  constraint  than 
independent investors. We observe no significant difference in contractual approach between 
“regional” VCs and bank-affiliated investors. 
The  coefficient  of  the  variable  measuring  VCs’  individual  experience  is  negative  and 
strongly significant under all specifications. The more experienced the VCs, the less they use 
financial contracts and securities to mitigate agency conflict risks (Hypothesis H2). Kaplan, 
                                                 
8  The  variable  representing  the  number  of  portfolio  companies  is  multi-correlated  with  a  number  of  other 
variables and is thus excluded from the regressions. Also for multi-correlation reasons, the variable measuring 17 
 
Martel and Strömberg (2007), on the contrary, observe that experienced VCs rely on more 
sophisticated  contracts  giving  greater  protection  against  these  risks.  Controlling  for  the 
collective experience variables used by these authors (i.e experience measured at firm level), 
our tests find a negative impact for experience proxied by the age of the VC firm and no 
significant  result  for  experience  proxied  by  the  amount  under  management.  In  line  with 
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2008), our findings therefore validate the idea that formal contracts 
are expensive (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) and that experience provides investors with the 
ability to substitute informal agreements for formal contracts designed to mitigate agency 
conflict  risks.  Regression  (6)  shows  that  the  role  of  experience  is  significant  for  both 
independent and non-independent investors.  
Last, the findings reported in Table 4 confirm the critical role of the level of agency 
conflicts when structuring VC contracts (positive significant coefficient on the early stage 
focus variable) as well as the existence of institutional isomorphism driven by the individual 
network developed during deal syndication (positive significant coefficient on the variable 
indicating syndication with Anglo-American VCs). However, the educational background of 
the investor does not affect VCs’ contracts.  
The regressions reported in Table 5 refine analysis of the role of affiliation and experience 
in contract design by type of investment. More specifically, VCs are classified according to 
two criteria characterizing the VC firm’s investment focus: the portfolio companies’ stage of 
development (early stage vs. later stage) and the average transaction size. A proxy for average 
transaction size is computed as the ratio of the amount under management to the number of 
portfolio  companies
9.  Investors  are  then  split  into  two  groups,  according  to  whether  the 
average transaction size proxy is below or above the average transaction size for the whole 
sample. The Table 5 models are re-estimated through Poisson regressions taking our index (I) 
as the dependent variable. 
Regressions (1A; 1B) and (2A; 2B) include interaction variables combining affiliation 
and,  respectively,  the  dummy  for  the  investment-stage  focus  and  the  dummy  for  average 
transaction  size.  Among  investors  focusing  on  expansion  and  later  stages,  contractual 
protection  differs  significantly  and  strongly  with  affiliation.  Moreover,  we  observe  that 
contracts  written  by  independent  VCs  focusing  on  later  and  expansion  stages  are  not 
significantly less protective than those established by VCs with an early-stage focus. With 
                                                                                                                                                         
the amount under management cannot be introduced simultaneously with the variable measuring the age of the 
VC firm, nor with the variables identifying “regional” or bank-affiliated VC firms.  18 
 
strong  financial  performance  objective  constraints,  independent  investors  implement 
protective  contracts,  even  when  agency  conflict  risks  may  appear  lower.  Introducing 
interaction variables combining affiliation and a proxy for the average transaction size leads 
to a similar observation. While the costs and efforts required for implementation of complex 
contracts  (legal  costs,  time  spent  on  negotiation,  learning,  etc)  could  lead  investors  with 
smaller financial amounts at stake to abandon sophisticated contracts, independent investors 
with smaller financial amounts at stake write contracts that are just as protective as those used 
by independent investors involved on average in larger transactions.  
Last,  regressions  (3)  and  (4)  include  interaction  variables  combining  experience  and, 
respectively, the dummy for the investment stage focus and average transaction size. The 
investors’  personal  experience,  measured  as  the  number  of  years,  remains  a  significant 
determinant  of  the  level  of  contractual  protection  in  both  the  sub-sample  of  early-stage 
focused investors and the subsample of later-stage focused investors. Similarly, experience 
significantly  affects  both  contracts  written  by  investors  with  smaller  financial  amounts  at 
stake and those implemented by investors with the highest transaction sizes.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Results  in  this  paper  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that  VCs  do  not  constitute  a 
homogeneous population. In particular, the paper shows that contractual practices strongly 
differ according to VC affiliation and experience. Our results come from the French venture 
capital industry, which exhibits a highly diverse range of VC affiliation and experience.  
Independent VCs, under greater financial performance constraints, have more contractual 
protection against the risks of agency conflicts than non-independent VCs, particularly those 
affiliated to a bank or financed by regional authorities and/or regional branches of mutual 
banking  groups.  In addition, independent investors implement more contractual protection 
even when they mostly invest in companies with presumably weaker agency conflict risks or 
when the financial amounts at stake are modest. Last, we observe that contractual protection 
against these risks for both independent and non-independent VCs is weaker when the VC’s 
personal experience in the venture capital industry is longer. Experience therefore provides 
investors with the ability to substitute certain informal governance mechanisms for complex 
                                                                                                                                                         
9 This ratio is an approximation of the average transaction size, as the amount under management does not 
necessary equal the amount invested. 19 
 
contracts;  it  also  remains  a  significant  determinant  of  the  level  of  contractual  protection, 
regardless of the investment stage focus or the average financial amount at stake.  
Our  paper  complements  the  literature  on  the  determinants  of  VC  contracts,  which 
essentially  focuses  on  the  role  of  the  degree  of  risks  of  agency  conflicts  between  the 
entrepreneur and the investor (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). The paper also enhances the 
literature  highlighting  the  heterogeneity  in  VC’s  objectives  and  investment  behaviors 
according to affiliation (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 2007; Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 
2008) and experience (Sorensen, 2007) by incorporating the contractual aspects associated 
with these disparities. More directly, our results complement the findings of Hirsh and Walz 
(2006) on the role of affiliation on German VC contracts; they add to those of Bengtsson and 
Sensoy (2008) but diverge from Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007) on the influence of 
experience. In more general terms, this paper is part of the current of research that aims to fill 
gaps in the knowledge on VC contracts outside of the US (Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg, 
2007;  Lerner  and  Schoar,  2005)  and  therefore  pays  increasing  attention  to  the  regional 
characteristics of VC markets.  
Future research should focus on understanding whether contracts also vary according to 
the entrepreneur’s profile. Such an approach would require data on contracts broken down by 
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“VCF_Independent, Yes” identifies VCs working for an independent VC firm. “VCF_Bank, Yes” identifies VCs 
working for a VC firm affiliated to a financial institution (bank or insurance company). “VCF_Regional, Yes” 
identifies VCs working for a VC firm financed by regional authorities and/or regional branches of a mutual 
banking group.  
“VC_Experience”  measures  the  number  of  years  the  VC  has  spent  in  the  venture  capital  industry. 
“VC_US_Syndication” takes the value of 1 if the VC invests “occasionally”, “often” or “always” alongside 
Anglo-American  VC  firms  or  firms  affiliated  to  an  Anglo-American  entity,  0  otherwise. 
“VC_Science_Education” takes the value of 1 when the individual has an initial or complementary educational 
background in sciences (engineering school, master's degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  
“VCF_Age” measures the age of the VC firm in 2007. “VCF_ Amount” is the amount under management by the 
firm (in millions of euros) and “VCF_Number” is the number of companies in its portfolio. “VCF_Early_Stage” 
takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm which makes more than 50% of its investments in the 
earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage), 0 otherwise.  
In columns (A), asterisks indicate significant differences in means between the two categories at 1%***, 5%**, 
and 10%* levels. 
TOTAL (A) VCF_Bank VCF_Regional (A)
Yes No Yes Yes
Number of VCs 99 47 52 34 10
% of sample 100,0% 47,5% 52,5% 34,3% 10,1%
VC_Experience
N valid 84,8% 85,1% 84,6% 79,4% 90,0%
Mean 9,9 9,2 10,6 n.s 11,2 11,2 n.s
Median 8 7 8 9 9
Standard errors 5,8 5,3 6,2 6,3 6,3
VC_US_Syndication
N valid 73,7% 70,2% 76,9% 73,5% 90,0%
N "yes" 48 23 25 18 3
Mean (% "yes") 65,8% 69,7% 62,5% n.s 72,0% 33,3% **
Standard errors 47,8% 46,7% 49,0% 45,8% 50,0%
VC_Science_Education
N valid 92,9% 100,0% 86,5% 82,4% 90,0%
N "yes" 41 26 15 8 1
Mean (% "yes") 44,6% 55,3% 33,3% ** 28,6% 11,1% n.s
Standard errors 50,0% 50,3% 47,7% 46,0% 33,3%
VCF_Age 
(1)
N valid 98,0% 100,0% 96,2% 94,1% 100,0%
Mean 12,9 12,6 13,2 n.s 12,6 17,4 n.s
Median 10 8 10 10 16
Standard errors 9,4 9,8 9,2 7,9 13,3
VCF_Amount 
(1)
N valid 97,0% 100,0% 94,2% 94,1% 90,0%
Mean 236,6 235,8 237,3 n.s 282,1 15,0 ***
Median 250,0 200,0 250,0 300,0 12,0
Standard errors 185,1 199,8 172,0 106,2 7,9
VCF_Number 
(1)
N valid 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Mean 51,7 37,9 64,2 *** 77,3 42,9 n.s
Median 40,0 33,0 55,0 55,0 38,0
Standard errors 51,4 34,4 60,6 68,9 33,1
VCF_Early_Stage 
(1)
N valid 99,0% 97,9% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
N "yes" 54 27 27 16 4
Mean (% "yes") 55,1% 58,7% 51,9% n.s 47,1% 40,0% n.s
Standard errors 50,0% 58,7% 50,5% 50,7% 51,6%
VCF_Independent
(1)  As the analysis is based at the individual level, mean characteristics of VC firms are weighted by the number of VCs 
     in each VC firm  23 
 
Table 2 
Correlations between Descriptive Variables 
Table 2 reports Pearson correlations between the variables describing VC firms and VCs. 
 
“VCF_Independent” is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the VC works for an independent VC firm, 0 otherwise. “VCF_Bank” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC 
firm affiliated to a financial institution (bank or insurance company), 0 otherwise. “VCF_Regional” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm financed by regional 
authorities and/or regional branches of a mutual banking group. “VCF_Age” measures the age of the VC firm in 2007. “VCF_Amount” is the amount under management by the firm (in 
millions of euros) and “VCF_Number” is the number of companies in its portfolio. “VCF_Early Stage” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm which makes more than 
50% of its investments in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage), 0 otherwise. “VC_Experience” measures the number of years the VC has spent in the venture 
capital industry. “VC_US_Syndication” takes the value of 1 if the VC invests “occasionally”, “often” or “always” alongside Anglo-American VC firms or firms affiliated to an Anglo-
American entity, 0 otherwise. “VC_Science_Education” takes the value of 1 when the individual has an initial or complementary educational background in sciences (engineering school, 
master's degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  
 













-0,077 0,033 0,143 -0,315 ***
log 
(VCF_Amount)
0,051 0,307 *** -0,623 *** -0,041 0,323 ***
log 
(VCF_Number)
-0,323 *** 0,425 *** -0,048 -0,193 * 0,599 *** 0,506 ***
log
(VC_Experience)
-0,132 0,185 * 0,076 -0,144 0,254 ** 0,059 0,331 ***
VC_
US_Syndication
0,075 0,095 -0,256 ** 0,101 -0,085 0,189 -0,062 0,058
VC_
Science_Education
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Table 3 
The Determinants of VC’s Contractual Practices - Univariate Analyses 
Surveyed VCs were asked to indicate, on a scale varying from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“always”), how frequently they implement various contractual mechanisms and financial securities. 
The first rows in Table 3 report the overall mean for each mechanism and the percentage of VCs that frequently (“often” or “always”) use these contractual provisions. Table 3 then 
presents the mean answers by investor affiliation and experience and the type of investment stage focus. 
“VCF_Independent, Yes” identifies VCs working for an independent VC firm. “VCF_Bank, Yes” identifies VCs working for a VC firm affiliated to a financial institution (bank or 
insurance company). “VCF_Regional, Yes” identifies VCs working for a VC firm financed by regional authorities and/or regional branches of a mutual banking group.  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 96 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 97 97 94 94 97 98 98 98 97 97 97 97 97
2,01 2,73 3,21 2,02 2,54 3,88 3,22 3,54 3,67 2,08 3,51 1,76 3,09 3,26 2,76 3,39 3,34 2,85 3,14 3,18 3,92 1,80 1,81 1,99 4,27 4,42 3,97 4,45 4,22
Standard errors 1,13 1,14 1,32 1,00 1,36 1,02 1,24 1,47 0,91 1,03 1,28 0,99 1,24 0,92 1,32 1,03 1,19 0,98 1,14 1,16 1,27 0,88 0,98 1,08 1,19 1,03 1,17 1,04 1,15
14,3% 28,6% 54,1% 10,2% 23,5% 75,5% 49,0% 58,2% 58,3% 7,1% 64,3% 6,1% 45,5% 48,5% 41,4% 55,6% 50,5% 21,6% 44,7% 43,6% 70,1% 7,1% 4,1% 10,2% 82,5% 86,6% 70,1% 88,7% 80,4%
2.Mean Answers by Investor Affiliation
No 1,92 2,73 2,88 1,98 2,49 3,80 3,02 3,27 3,86 2,14 3,16 1,63 3,37 3,10 2,56 3,48 2,94 2,62 3,04 2,94 3,39 1,47 1,71 1,84 3,96 4,18 3,82 4,26 3,96
Yes 2,11 2,74 3,57 2,06 2,60 3,96 3,45 3,83 3,44 2,02 3,89 1,89 2,79 3,45 2,98 3,30 3,78 3,11 3,24 3,43 4,50 2,15 1,91 2,15 4,60 4,68 4,13 4,66 4,49
Diff. *** * * ** *** ** * *** ** ** *** *** *** ** * **
VCF_Regional Yes 1,50 2,50 2,30 1,70 2,60 4,10 3,10 2,30 4,40 2,40 2,90 1,60 3,60 2,90 1,70 3,50 3,10 2,30 2,78 2,67 2,70 1,40 1,80 1,50 3,78 3,78 3,22 3,78 3,78
VCF_Independent Yes 2,11 2,74 3,57 2,06 2,60 3,96 3,45 3,83 3,44 2,02 3,89 1,89 2,79 3,45 2,98 3,30 3,78 3,11 3,24 3,43 4,50 2,15 1,91 2,15 4,60 4,68 4,13 4,66 4,49
Diff. *** ** *** ** * * *** * ** ** *** ** **
VCF_Bank Yes 2,15 2,79 2,91 2,12 2,58 3,79 2,97 3,30 3,82 2,06 3,00 1,52 3,41 3,03 2,65 3,50 2,73 2,62 3,10 2,90 3,48 1,42 1,61 2,03 3,97 4,18 3,85 4,27 3,79
VCF_Independent Yes 2,11 2,74 3,57 2,06 2,60 3,96 3,45 3,83 3,44 2,02 3,89 1,89 2,79 3,45 2,98 3,30 3,78 3,11 3,24 3,43 4,50 2,15 1,91 2,15 4,60 4,68 4,13 4,66 4,49
Diff. ** * * *** * ** ** *** ** * *** *** ** ** ***
VCF_Bank Yes 2,15 2,79 2,91 2,12 2,58 3,79 2,97 3,30 3,82 2,06 3,00 1,52 3,41 3,03 2,65 3,50 2,73 2,62 3,10 2,90 3,48 1,42 1,61 2,03 3,97 4,18 3,85 4,27 3,79
VCF_Regional Yes 1,50 2,50 2,30 1,70 2,60 4,10 3,10 2,30 4,40 2,40 2,90 1,60 3,60 2,90 1,70 3,50 3,10 2,30 2,78 2,67 2,70 1,40 1,80 1,50 3,78 3,78 3,22 3,78 3,78
Diff. * ** **







Table 3 (continued) 
The Determinants of VC’s Contractual Practices - Univariate Analyses 
“VC_Experience, High” identifies VCs who have spent more than 10 years in the venture capital industry (sample mean experience). “VC_US_Syndication, Yes” identifies VCs 
investing “occasionally”, “often” or “always” alongside Anglo-American VC firms or firms affiliated to an Anglo-American entity. “VC_Science_Education” takes the value of 1 when 
the individual has an initial or complementary educational background in sciences (engineering school, master's degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  “VCF_Age, High” 
identifies VCs working for a VC firm aged of 13 or more (sample mean age). “VCF_Early_Stage” identifies VCs working for a VC firm which makes more than 50% of its investments 
in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage). 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Mean Answers by Experience
Low 1,96 2,65 3,59 1,98 2,59 3,81 3,19 3,87 3,63 2,07 3,89 1,83 2,98 3,46 3,07 3,28 3,60 3,06 3,35 3,37 4,20 1,96 1,70 1,85 4,34 4,51 4,06 4,43 4,28
High 2,14 2,90 2,86 2,31 2,24 4,00 3,21 3,14 3,82 2,10 3,10 1,66 3,13 3,13 2,53 3,43 3,10 2,59 2,82 2,93 3,52 1,53 1,97 2,20 4,17 4,27 3,73 4,43 4,10
Diff. ** ** ** * * ** ** * ** **
No 1,64 2,52 3,00 1,84 2,48 4,08 2,76 2,60 4,08 2,00 3,12 1,72 3,64 3,04 2,12 3,64 3,28 2,63 3,39 3,17 3,48 1,72 1,80 2,00 4,13 4,17 3,83 4,33 4,08
Yes 2,13 2,72 3,36 2,23 2,49 3,79 3,45 4,00 3,52 2,19 3,77 1,74 2,79 3,40 3,17 3,27 3,38 2,98 3,06 3,15 4,17 1,85 1,88 2,04 4,31 4,48 4,00 4,42 4,23
Diff. * * ** *** ** ** *** *** **
No 1,94 2,71 2,96 2,14 2,80 3,98 3,14 3,41 3,67 2,29 3,31 1,80 3,31 3,18 2,47 3,69 3,12 2,64 3,16 2,94 3,69 1,63 2,00 2,04 4,12 4,30 3,76 4,36 4,06
Yes 2,15 2,88 3,80 1,93 2,10 3,73 3,45 3,93 3,58 1,88 3,98 1,78 2,63 3,51 3,27 2,98 3,85 3,23 3,13 3,60 4,43 2,12 1,68 2,02 4,59 4,73 4,37 4,71 4,61
Diff. *** ** * * *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** ** *** * ***
Low 2,02 2,72 3,53 2,00 2,52 3,92 3,48 3,84 3,63 2,05 3,73 1,84 2,85 3,48 3,11 3,29 3,53 3,03 3,35 3,48 4,16 1,91 1,82 2,00 4,42 4,58 4,18 4,48 4,35
High 2,00 2,78 2,66 2,06 2,56 3,75 2,78 3,06 3,66 2,13 3,06 1,53 3,53 2,91 2,13 3,53 2,97 2,47 2,60 2,63 3,42 1,61 1,77 1,97 3,90 4,03 3,47 4,37 3,87
Diff. *** *** ** ** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ** * ** ** *
4.Mean Answers by Type of Investment Stage Focus
No 1,89 2,91 2,39 1,93 2,75 4,02 2,84 3,09 3,77 2,43 2,77 1,82 3,52 2,98 2,48 3,80 2,68 2,52 2,93 2,55 3,38 1,53 1,70 1,77 4,00 4,10 3,69 4,24 3,88
Yes 2,08 2,57 3,89 2,08 2,40 3,74 3,53 3,94 3,58 1,81 4,11 1,68 2,76 3,48 2,96 3,06 3,88 3,15 3,30 3,65 4,33 2,00 1,87 2,13 4,46 4,67 4,19 4,61 4,48
Diff. *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** * * ** ** **








The Determinants of VC’s Contractual Practices - Multivariate Analyses  
 
The dependant variable is index (I) which is a measure of the level of contractual protection against agency conflict risks. This index is constructed as defined pages 15-16. Index (I) 
varies from 0 to 7. 
“VCF_Independent” is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the VC works for an independent VC firm, 0 otherwise. “VCF_Bank” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC 
firm affiliated to a financial institution (bank or insurance company), 0 otherwise. “VCF_Regional” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm financed by regional 
authorities and/or regional branches of a mutual banking group. “VCF_Other” takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm which is neither independent, nor bank-affiliated, 
nor regional, 0 otherwise. “VCF_Age” measures the age of the VC firm in 2007. “VCF_Amount” is the amount under management by the firm (in millions of euros). “VCF_Early Stage” 
takes the value of 1 when the VC works for a VC firm which makes more than 50% of its investments in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage), 0 otherwise. 
“VC_Experience” measures the number of years the VC has spent in the venture capital industry. “VC_US_Syndication” takes the value of 1 if the VC invests “occasionally”, “often” or 
“always” alongside Anglo-American VC firms or firms affiliated to an Anglo-American entity, 0 otherwise. “VC_Science_Education” takes the value of 1 when the individual has an 
initial or complementary educational background in sciences (engineering school, master's degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  
We estimate the models using Poisson regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significant differences at 1%***, 5%**, and 10%* levels.  
 
INDEX I (1) (2A) (2B) (3) (4A) (4B) (5) (6)
C 1,728 (0,24) *** 1,978 (0,24) *** 1,654 (0,25) *** 0,578 (0,58) 1,647 (0,25) *** 1,279 (0,26) *** 1,975 (0,28) *** 0,766 (0,55)
VCF_Independent 0,311 (0,11) *** 0,325 (0,13) ** 0,347 (0,11) *** 0,368 (0,11) *** 0,324 (0,11) ***
VCF_Regional -0,713 (0,33) ** -0,389 (0,35) -0,682 (0,32) ** -0,314 (0,34)
VCF_Bank -0,325 (0,13) ** -0,368 (0,11) ***
VCF_Other -0,013 (0,11) 0,311 (0,14) ** -0,076 (0,11) 0,292 (0,12) **
log (VC_Experience) -0,378 (0,10) *** -0,316 (0,10) *** -0,316 (0,10) *** -0,346 (0,10) *** -0,269 (0,09) *** -0,269 (0,09) *** -0,311 (0,10) ***
VC_US_Syndication 0,357 (0,13) *** 0,305 (0,12) *** 0,305 (0,12) *** 0,287 (0,12) ** 0,278 (0,11) ** 0,278 (0,11) ** 0,338 (0,14) ** 0,277 (0,12) **
VC_Science_Education 0,106 (0,10) 0,046 (0,10) 0,046 (0,10) 0,042 (0,11) -0,007 (0,10) -0,007 (0,10) 0,086 (0,11) 0,035 (0,11)
VCF_Early_Stage 0,464 (0,14) *** 0,432 (0,14) *** 0,432 (0,14) *** 0,454 (0,14) ***
log (VCF _Amount) 0,070 (0,05) 0,070 (0,05)
log (VCF_Age) -0,171 0,087 *
log (VC_Experience) * VCF_Independent -0,262 (0,09) ***
log (VC_Experience) * (1-VCF_Independent) -0,433 (0,11) ***
N 71 71 71 69 71 71 70 69
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 8,4% 10,1% 10,1% 11,7% 13,3% 13,3% 9,4% 12,0%
R-squared 25,9% 32,1% 32,1% 31,2% 39,1% 39,1% 27,1% 32,7%
Adjusted R-squared 21,4% 25,8% 25,8% 24,6% 32,4% 32,4% 21,4% 26,2%  27 
 
Table 5 
The Determinants of VC’s Contractual Practices - Multivariate Analyses  
The dependant variable is index (I) which is a measure of the level of contractual protection against agency conflict risks. This index is constructed as defined pages 15-16. Index (I) 
varies from 0 to 7. “VCF_Independent” is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the VC works for an independent VC firm, 0 otherwise. “VCF_Early Stage” takes the value of 1 when 
the VC works for a VC firm which makes more than 50% of its investments in the earliest development stages (seed/start-up or early-stage), 0 otherwise.  “VCF_Transaction+” takes the 
value  of  1  when  the  VC  works  for  a  VC  firm  with  a  ratio  “amount  under  management  /  number  of  companies  in  portfolio”  which  is  above  the  whole-sample  mean  ratio. 
“VC_Experience” measures the number of years the VC has spent in the venture capital industry. VC_US_Syndication” takes the value of 1 if the VC invests “occasionally”, “often” or 
“always” alongside Anglo-American VC firms or firms affiliated to an Anglo-American entity, 0 otherwise. “VC_Science_Education” takes the value of 1 when the individual has an 
initial or complementary educational background in sciences (engineering school, master's degree or doctorate in sciences, etc.), 0 otherwise.  
We estimate the models using Poisson regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significant differences at 1%***, 5%**, and 10%* levels.   
 
INDEX I (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3) (4)
C 0,165 (0,65) 1,303 (0,62) ** 0,808 (0,64) 1,236 (0,58) ** 0,901 (0,57) 0,965 (0,65)
VCF_Independent 0,331 (0,10) *** 0,327 (0,11) ***
log (VC_Experience) -0,274 (0,10) *** -0,274 (0,10) *** -0,355 (0,10) *** -0,355 (0,10) ***
VC_US_Syndication 0,209 (0,12) * 0,209 (0,12) * 0,309 (0,12) ** 0,309 (0,12) ** 0,295 (0,12) ** 0,289 (0,12) **
VC_Science_Education 0,026 (0,10) 0,026 (0,10) 0,060 (0,11) 0,060 (0,11) 0,064 (0,10) 0,059 (0,11)
log (VCF_Amount) 0,050 (0,05) 0,050 (0,05) 0,043 (0,06) 0,043 (0,06) 0,073 (0,05) 0,034 (0,06)
VCF_Early_Stage 0,465 (0,14) *** 0,465 (0,14) *** 0,469 (0,14) ***
VCF_Independent*VCF_Early_Stage 1,263 (0,35) *** 0,125 (0,15)
VCF_Independent*(1-VCF_Early_Stage) 1,138 (0,37) ***
(1-VCF_Independent)*VCF_Early_Stage 1,157 (0,36) *** 0,019 (0,13)
(1-VCF_Independent)*(1-VCF_Early_Stage) -1,138 (0,37) ***
VCF_Independent*VCF_Transaction+ 0,429 (0,17) ** 0,002 (0,19)
VCF_Independent*(1-VCF_Transaction+) 0,427 (0,14) ***
(1-VCF_Independent)*VCF_Transaction+ 0,274 (0,16) * -0,153 (0,18)
(1-VCF_Independent)*(1-VCF_Transaction+) -0,427 (0,14) ***
log (VC_Experience)*VCF_Early_Stage -0,293 (0,09) ***
log (VC_Experience)*(1-VCF_Early_Stage) -0,513 (0,11) ***
log (VC_Experience)*VCF_Transaction+ -0,277 (0,11) **
log (VC_Experience)*(1-VCF_Transaction+) -0,352 (0,10) ***
N 69 69 69 69 69 69
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 15,3% 15,3% 12,2% 12,2% 12,1% 12,1%
R-squared 44,2% 44,2% 34,0% 34,0% 32,2% 32,4%
Adjusted R-squared 37,8% 37,8% 25,1% 25,1% 25,7% 24,6%  